

| Xen Overview Overview | Xen Overview Overview |
|--|--|
| Overview | Non-interpreter VMs |
| | |
| | DomU DomU' Dom0 |
| • Xen is a VMM (also called a Hypervisor) | VMM |
| Xen was originally written to support paravirtualization | |
| And Linux and Windows were ported to Xen | hardware |
| But Windows was never more than a proof of concept | |
| Xen has been extended to support AMD and Intel virtualization extensions | Small VMM, 100K lines of code |
| • Xen is the default base for cloud computing | Huge Dom0, 12M lines of code |
| | Arbitrary number of DomU's |
| | Each DomU is created with a new number |
| | Work split between VMM and Dom0 |
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Xen Overview Overviev

Processor assumptions

- We're going to assume that at most one processor is executing in DomU
- This simplifies concurrency control within the Kernel
- (Without this assumption, the kernel needs to lock all resources before use to prevent race condition, needs to worry about memory consistency)
- Note that this is the default for Xen
- Enabling multiple processors to concurrently execute in the OS is a large undertaking, it took 3 years to do this with Linux

Overview

Things to ignore

There are a lot of things that are not relevant for now. Ignore all discussion of

- HVM (hardware virtual machine). (We will run paravirtualized).
- Hypercalls which can be made only from Dom0 .
- which are a way of writing code which is both paravirtualizable and natively executable

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• 64-bit code, we are running 32-bit code (even on a 64-bit hypervisor)

Xen expects all 32-bit Intel code to be PAE enabled. This effects only paging.

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Xen Overview

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Xen vs. Architecture

| Xen | purpose |
|------------------------|--|
| rings/regions | privilege and isolation |
| event | asynchronous notification |
| XenStore start_info | information used to configure OS |
| hypercall | invoke more privileged code |
| virtual memory | memory management |
| device front-ends | I/O |
| barriers | ensure memory operations ordered |
| | between Dom0 and DomU |
| | |
| | rings/regions event XenStore start_info hypercall virtual memory device front-ends |

Segmentation Part II Segmentation

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Segmentation

Segmentation

- The x86 architecture supports both
 - Segmentation and
 - Paging
- A virtual address is first translated by segmentation, and then the resulting **linear address** is paged.
- OS designers have largely opted to ignore segmentation, in Linux

| KERNEL_CS | (Kernel code segment, | base=0, limit=4GB, DPL=0) |
|-----------|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| KERNEL_DS | (Kernel data segment, | base=0, limit=4GB, DPL=0) |
| USER_CS | (User code segment, | base=0, limit=4GB, DPL=3) |
| USER_DS | (User data segment, | base=0, limit=4GB, DPL=3) |

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
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
- Thus Xen starts up with a flat segmented address space
- each segment starts at 0 and is 2^{32} bytes in size.

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Memory map



Segmentation




Rings of Protections

Traditional 32-bit OS on bare metal

Rings of Protections

Rings of Protections

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• ring 0 is the most privileged

Rings (X86_32)


- normally, an OS runs in ring 0 and user space runs in ring 3
- this is a traditional UNIX model
- but it is possible to use the rings to provide better isolation, for example OS kernel in ring 0 and device drivers in ring 1
- $\bullet\,$ ring i has limited access to ring j < i and unlimited access to $k \geq i$
- Typical setup: Xen runs in ring 0, OS runs in 1, user space in ring 3

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



Ring 3 Ring 1 Ring 1 Ring 0 kernel User Space

Proceeding (X86_64) Proceed

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Hypercalls

Hypercalls • Only Xen can execute privilege instructions, so the OS must request these from Xen • To request Xen services, Hypercalls are made • There are Hypercalls for scheduling, paging, interrupts, ... • The inline C function invokes a CPP macro, _hypercall2 which takes: • A return type • The name of the call • and 2 arguments, cmd and arg static inline int HYPERVISOR_sched_op(int cmd, ulong arg) { return _hypercall2(int, sched_op, cmd, arg);

see include/hypercall-x86_32.h for some calls

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Hypercalls (cont'd)


• _hypercall2 (for two arguments) is a C pre-processor macro

Hypercalls

- It passes arguments through EAX, EBX, and ECX registers
- It CALLs an address, with a (4096 byte) hypercall page
- Each call, such as sched_op, uses 32 bytes on the hypercall page
- This means that up to 128 hypercalls are possible, although 45 or so are in use
- _hypercall2 is ugly because
 - It uses advanced macro features
 - It embeds assembly language (asm volatile) in C code
 - It is architecture/Xen specific

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Traps and system calls

System calls

- In addition to Hypercalls (from kernel to Xen), system calls (from user space to kernel) are needed
- Typically made with an interrupt x80 (alt. SYSENTER/SYSEXIT or SYSCALL/SYSRET)
- Parameters passed in registers (typ. EAX, EBX, ECX)
- This causes control to pass to Xen
- Xen then creates a register packet and then invokes the OS

Traps and system calls

Traps

- ethos/arch/x86/traps.c
- Submits a virtual IDT to the hypervisor.
- This consists of tuples
 - interrupt number
 - privilege ring
 - CS:EIP of handler.
- The 'privilege ring' field specifies the least-privileged ring that
- can trap to that vector using a software-interrupt instruction (INT).
- does not effect hardware induced traps, which go to Xen since they are not necessarily associated with the currently executing Domain.

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Xen trap table static trap_info_t trap_table[] = { { 0, 0, __KERNEL_CS, (ulong)divide_error }

Traps and system calls

{ 1, 0, __KERNEL_CS, (ulong)debug }, { 3, 3, __KERNEL_CS, (ulong)int3 }, { 4, 3, __KERNEL_CS, (ulong)overflow }, { 5, 3, __KERNEL_CS, (ulong)bounds }, { 6, 0, __KERNEL_CS, (ulong)invalid_op }, { 7, 0, __KERNEL_CS, (ulong)device_not_available { 9, 0, __KERNEL_CS, (ulong)coprocessor_segment_ { 10, 0, __KERNEL_CS, (ulong)invalid_TSS }, { 11, 0, __KERNEL_CS, (ulong)segment_not_present }

Traps and system callsXen trap table{ 12, 0, ...KERNEL_CS, (ulong)stack_segment},{ 13, 0, ...KERNEL_CS, (ulong)general_protection},{ 14, 0, ...KERNEL_CS, (ulong)page_fault},{ 15, 0, ...KERNEL_CS, (ulong)spurious_interrupt_br{ 16, 0, ...KERNEL_CS, (ulong)coprocessor_error},{ 17, 0, ...KERNEL_CS, (ulong)alignment_check},{ 19, 0, ...KERNEL_CS, (ulong)simd_coprocessor_err{ 0x80,3, ...KERNEL_CS, (ulong)syscall},

{0,0,0,0, {0,0,0,0,

void
init(void)

HYPERVISOR_set_trap_table(trap_table);

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
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Interrupt use

Interrupts/events

- Events (Interrupts) cause transitions between levels.
- From the kernel viewpoint,
 - these transitions look like system calls
 - with the exception that they can occur when already in the kernel.
- In terms of the less privilege level, it is not expecting an interrupt
- So after an interrupt, it is important to return to the less privileged level as if no interrupt occurred.
- At the hardware level, this is called **precise interrupts** in which the user-visible state is
 - preserved at the time of interrupt
 - restored upon return from interrupt

Interrupts and Xen events

- System calls and Hypervisor calls are transitions from less privileged to more privileged.
- They are caused by the less privileged level asking for privileged services
- But it is also necessary for the more privileged levels to assert control over what can call it and how the call is handled
- At the hardware level, this is done through interrupts
- Which bring control to a (presumably lower) level

Interrupt use

- The level is determined by the code segment
- The code segment embeds the privilege (i.e., ring) level
- The Xen to Kernel corresponding are called (Xen) events

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Interrupt code in the kernel

- Since an interrupt/event can arrive when the kernel is doing something else
- It is important to prevent race conditions
- It is possible to lock all data structures used by the interrupt
- But locking must be done in both the interrupt code (small) *and* the non-interrupt code
- To simplify this issue, minimum processing is done at the time of interrupt (**upper half**)
- For example, copying packet from an ethernet device
- And the remainder of processing deferred to some convenient time (**bottom half**)
- Such as just before the kernel is going to return to user space

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Interrupt use Xen events Advantages of split interrupt handling • Locks are minimized in upper half and in the remainder of the Part VII kernel Lock bugs are really unpleasant • Forget a lock, and you have race condition which is difficult to Xen events debug • Locks also have performance implications since they block execution • Upper half does all time-critical functions, maximizing concurrency of CPU with devices preventing lost interrupts and thus lost packets ・ロト ・四ト ・ヨト ・ヨト ∃ 990 ・ ロ と ・ (雪 と ・ (目 と э. Secure OS Design and Implementation Ion A. Solworth Xen Secure OS Design and Implementation Xen

Xen events

Xen event use

- There are a fixed number of interrupt types in a processor
- There is a Xen event **channel** for each of these interrupts
- An endpoint of a channel is called a **port**
- In addition, channels may be created for inter-domain communication
- A Xen event must be sent along a channel
- to send an event an entity in Xen, must have access to the channel.
- To receive an event, must have a handler (procedure) associated with the event in the receiver.
- Obviously, if this is inter-domain communication
 - the channel must be created (receiver)
 - the handler must be installed for that event (receiver)
 - the senders must be informed of the name of the channel

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Event types

- Three broad categories of events:
 - interdomain,
 - physical IRQ, and
 - virtual IRQ
- physical IRQ are for Domain 0 or a driver Domain

Xen events

- virtual IRQ are for virtualized devices, such as clock, console
- interdomain events are used for data exchange between domains (and are used to indicate data waiting or consumed.
- interdomain events, unlike interrupts, are bidirectional

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Binding the timer virtual interrupt

evtchn_bind_virq_t op;

```
op.virq = VIRQ_TIMER;
op.vcpu = 0;
int status = HYPERVISOR_event_channel_op(
        EVTCHNOP_bind_virq, &op);
if (0 != status) { /* handle error */ }
```

• The hypercall set the port number, op.port.

Xen events

- Some channels are bound at Domain load time, including
- XenStore and console

Allocate an unbound interdomain event channel

Xen events

- An interdomain event channel has 2 domains, the *creating* and *opposite* domains.
- The creating domain creates the channel (and its associated port)

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• op.port contains port number

Xen events

Remote binding of an interdomain event channel

- The creating domain sends to the opposite domain creating_port and creating_domain
- These values are typically sent by writing to the XenStore
- The opposite domain binds to the event channel

Getting started


• Its a good idea to start with all the events masked

Xen events

- typically, OS initialization brings up services one at a time and it is only after a service is initialized that the OS is ready to handle the corresponding event.
- when binding a new event, shared_info .evtchn_pending[0] bit should be cleared
- event delivery is disabled at boot time. So it is necessary to
 - clear shared_info .vcpu_info [0]. evtchn_upcall_mask
 - check shared_info .vcpu_info [0]. evtchn_upcall_pending and if set handle the event and clear the bit.
- Note that 0 is for VCPU 0, the only CPU in use by nanoOS.

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Xen events

find a vcpu which can process the event on the channel

This describes what Xen does to find a VCPU for an event

- 1: findEligibleVCPU(channel)
- 2: if channel bound to vcpu then
- 3: if unmaskedEvents(vcpu) then
- 4: return $\{vcpu\}$
- 5: **end if**
- 6: **else**

```
7: return {v : v \in vcpuSet | unmaskedEvents(v)}
```

- 8: end if
- 9: return {}

Initializing events

static evtchn_handler_t handlers[NUM_CHANNELS]; void EVT_IGN(evtchn_port_t port, struct pt_regs * regs) {}; // Initialise the event handlers void init_events(void) // Set the event delivery callbacks HYPERVISOR_set_callbacks(FLAT_KERNEL_CS, (ulong) hypervisor_callback, FLAT_KERNEL_CS, (ulong) failsafe_callback); // Set all handlers to ignore, and mask them for (uint i=0 ; i<NUM_CHANNELS ; i++)</pre> $handlers[i] = EVT_IGN;$ SET_BIT(i, shared_info.evtchn_mask[0]); // Allow upcalls. shared_info.vcpu_info [0].evtchn_upcall_mask = 0; ▲ 臣 ▶ ▲ 臣 ▶ ○ 臣 ○ � � � Secure OS Design and Implementation Xen

Event masking

This describe what happens (In Xen) when an event arrives

Xen events

- 1: if event already pending on channel then
- 2: return
- 3: **end if**
- 4: set pending bit for channel
- 5: if channel masked then
- 6: return
- 7: end if
- 8: if $\exists vcpu \in findEligibleVCPU(channel)$ then
- 9: set vcpu's pending flag
- 10: set vcpu's event selector
- 11: deliver event via upcall
- 12: end if

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Callbacks

• The number of events per domain is limited to 1024 (32 bits per word times 32 words)

Xen events

- A default handler, EVT_IGN which when called does nothing
- like all handler, it is passed the port number and the registers
- HYPERVISOR_set_callbacks gives two callback (from Xen to DomU)
- hypervisor_callback calls the specific handler for the event, it is assembly language which calls C
- for each possible channel, the default handler is defined and the corresponding evtchn_mask is set (still not accepting events)

Xen events

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Now the CPU's events are unmasked

Xen events

Event callbacks

void do_hypervisor_callback(struct pt_regs *regs) {
 vcpu_info_t *vcpu = &shared_info.vcpu_info[0];
 // Make sure we don't lose the edge on new events
 vcpu->evtchn_upcall_pending = 0;
 // Set the pending selector to 0 and
 // get the old value atomically
 uint pendingSelector
 = xchg(&vcpu->evtchn_pending_sel, 0);

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Event callbacks

```
while(pendingSelector != 0)
 // Get the first bit of the selector and clear it
  uint eventWord = first_bit(pendingSelector);
  pendingSelector &= ~(1 << eventWord);</pre>
  uint event:
  // While events are pending on unmasked ports (book bug)
  while(event = eventPendingAndUnmasked(eventWord))
    // Find the first waiting event in the eventWord
    uint eventBit = first_bit(event);
    // Combine the two offsets to get the port
    evtchn_port_t port = (eventWord << 5) + eventBit;</pre>
    // Handle the event
    handlers [port] (port, regs);
    // Clear the pending flag
    CLEAR_BIT(shared_info.evtchn_pending[0], eventBit);
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```

Xen events

Other issues with event call backs

- hypervisor_callback is an assembly language routine
- it is invoked by the Xen hypervisor when both the event and VCPU is unmasked
- It calls the C routine do_hypervisor_callback
- Which calls the individual handlers
- Still need to set up real handlers
- these are set up one at a time as associated service is initialized and then
- The event channel is unmasked

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Use of event handlers

- Initialize everything, including handlers
- Then enter the main event loop
- When a hardware event occurs, the interrupt mechanism disables interrupts

Xen events

• Hardware interrupts enabled by return from interrupt, Xen events enabled by assembly language code for rti processing

```
// main event loop
while (1) {
    __cli(); // disable events
    // do all periodic processing, set time events
    bottomhalf();
    __sti(); // re-enable events
```

// block OS until a new event occurs
HYPERVISOR_sched_op(SCHED_OP_block, &op);

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 System start

Event summary

- pseudo device event channels must be bound to by DomU (except for the prebound devices)
- Interdomain event channels must be created in one domain and bound to in a different domain.
- An event can be sent with a hypercall on the channel's port
- An event can be received by polling, but a more typical mechanism is to use a callback—a procedure which is invoked when an unmasked event arrives.
- Need to inform Xen of the callbacks
- One callback needs to invoke callbacks for each individual event

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System start
System Starts
When an OS starts, it interrogates its surroundings (BIOS, etc.) to determine the system configuration.
Thus it can determine whether it can run on the hardware, and how to organize itself.
In Xen, this mechanism is replaced with the start_info_page
This page includes information which does not change (unless the VM is migrated-i.e. resumed)
The start info page points shared_info
shared_info page is shared by Xen and the domain
it contains information which changes during execution
shared_info includes interrupt/events and time keeping

Start info

struct start_info { // The following are filled in both on initial boot and on re char magic [32]; // "Xen-v.s". where v is version and s // Total pages allocated to this domain. ulong nr_pages; ulong shared_info; // MACHINE address of shared info struct uint32 flags; // SIF_xxx flags. xen_pfn_t store_mfn; // MACHINE page number of shared page for uint32 store_evtchn; // Event channel for XenStore union { struct { xen_pfn_t mfn; // MACHINE page number of console page. uint32 evtchn; // Event channel for console page. } domU; // (dom0 console info not included) } console; // The following are filled on initial boot, but not resume. // VIRTUAL address of page directory. ulong pt_base: ulong nr_pt_frames; // Number of bootstrap p.t. frames. ulong mfn_list; // VIRTUAL address of page-frame list. Jon A. Solworth Secure OS Design and Implementation

System start

Start info notes in general, nr_pt_frames ≤ nr_pages The difference is unallocated pages which can be mapped and used for OS data structures User space pages mfn_list pseudo-physical to machine frame number map, i.e. ((ulong*) mfn_list)[p] is the machine frame number associated with physical frame number p.

System start

System start

Shared info

This data structure is stored in a page which is shared between Xen and the domain

Shared info comments

The shared info page contains info about

• for each virtual CPU (there can be as many as MAX_VIRT_CPUS although only 1 is initially active.

System start

- There are 1024 possible ports (on 32-bit). book bug (32/word and 32 words)
- The wall clock time is on a shared page, so that Xen maybe updating it while the OS is reading it, so
 - Xen makes the version number odd updating it
 - Xen then updates the value
 - Xen then increments the version number
- Thus, the OS reads the version number, read the values, and re-reads the version number to ensure that the number is both even and unchanged

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Virtual CPU Information

Part of the shared info

```
struct vcpu_info {
 uint8_t evtchn_upcall_pending;
 uint8_t evtchn_upcall_mask;
 ulong evtchn_pending_sel;
 struct arch_vcpu_info arch;
 struct vcpu_time_info time; // CPU time
}; /* 64 bytes (x86) */
```

System start

- evtchn_upcall_pending: set to non-zero by Xen to indicate pending events, cleared by OS. Only set if upcalls are masked.
- evtchn_upcall_mask: if non-zero, no upcall activation. Cleared when VCPU requests a block.
- evtchn_pending_sel: a bit mask where bit *i* is set if there is a pending event in the *i*th word, that is port $32i \dots 32i + 31$.

System start


vcpu time info

```
struct vcpu_time_info {
 // see xen.h for comments
 uint32 t version:
 // the next two values are as of the last time
 // Xen updated them. To get current time,
 // must do a RDTSC, etc.
 uint64_t tsc_timestamp; // TSC
 uint64_t system_time;
                        // Time, in nanosecs,
                             since boot.
 uint32_t tsc_to_system_mul;
 int8_t tsc_shift;
```

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Kernel startup code

char stack [8192]; // stack used by start_kernel

// shared_info declared in assembly, typed here extern volatile shared_info_t shared_info; // volat

void start_kernel(start_info_t * start_info)

// Map the shared info page HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping((ulong) & shared_info, __pte(start_info -> shared_info | 3), UVMF_INVLPG);

```
init_events();
```

// Initialise the console console_init(start_info);

Kernel startup code

start_kernel (cont'd)

// Write a message to check that it worked console_write("Hello_world!\n\r"); console_write("Xen_magic_string:_"); console_write(start_info->magic); console_write("\n\r");

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// Set up the XenStore driver
xenstore_init(start_info);
// Test the store
xenstore_test();
// Flush the console buffer
console_flush();
// Exit, since we don't know how to do anything els
}

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Kernel startup code

Notes


- stack is 8K, storage used in main and set up in the assembly language bootstrap
- updates to virtual address mapping are done by hypervisor calls to ensure that VM's access only their own pages.
- the upper 20 bits of the page table entry (pte) are used for the mapping (substituting page number for frame number).
- the lower 12 bits of the pte are used for flags
- The flags set must be 3, the low order bit to indicate that the page is present and the next bit to enable read and write privileges.
- UVMF_INVPG ensures the TLB is updated


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| Kernel startup code | Kernel startup code |
|--|---|
| Assembly language (bootstrap) | Assembly language (bootstrap cont'd) |
| <pre>// loader file information for Xen sectionxen_guest .ascii "GUEST_OS=Nano-OS" .ascii ",XEN_VER=xen-3.0" .ascii ",VIRT_BASE=0x0" .ascii ",ELF_PADDR_OFFSET=0x0" .ascii ",HYPERCALL_PAGE=0x2" .ascii ",PAE=yes" .ascii ",LOADER=generic" .byte 0 .text // declare the globals in this file .globl _start, shared_info, hypercall_page</pre> | <pre>// Initial entry point _start: cld</pre> |
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Time Two types of clocks, a cycle counter and a wall clock time Xen provides these to the OS via shared_info Problem: at nano-second granularity, a CPU would need to be dedicated to updating the wall clock time Instead, the Time Stamp Counter (TSC) is a hardware counter which can be read when necessary, converted to nano-seconds, and then used to produce a fine-grained wall clock. To do this, compute deltaTsc which is the current TSC less the TSC at the time the wall clock time was last updated Then scale it Then add it to the wall clock time

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Uses of time

• Alarms need to be set to ensure finite progress

Time

- Application programs often need time
- Time of day is often used to schedule periodic tasks (e.g., cron)
- Files are marked with the time created
- Time is needed to schedule time between processes
- One of the big difference between VMs and bare hardware is time
 - On VMs, time is not cycles
 - So OSs for VMs track virtual time, time which elapses only when the VM is running.

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Time

- Need to bind the timer virtual IRQ
- Can then set a timer

HYPERVISOR_set_timer_op(uint64 timeout)

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using the number of nanosecond from system (domain) boot to determine when the timer goes off.

• need to have a gettimeofday() routine to determine the current time

Time

- Time of day is relative to an **epoch**, Jan, 1, 1970 which is UNIX's birthday.
- So different uses of time are off different bases

Time

Oddities

- shared info pages are mapped into both Xen and the domain
- hence, it may be updated concurrently when read

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Time


- so a spin lock is built
- in Xen, updates are signalled using version number

version++; // make version odd
update values
version++; // make version even

- Need to ensure that value not being updated when read and
- Version has not changed after going even until values read

gettimeofday

```
inline uint64
NANOSECONDS(uint64 tsc)
{
  struct vcpu_time_info * time
               = &(shared_info.cpu_info[0].time);
               uint64 scaledTsc = tsc << time->tsc_shift;
    return scaledTsc * time->tsc_to_system_mul
}
inline bool
isOdd(uint32 v)
{
    return v & 1;
}
#define RDTSC(x) asm volatile ("RDTSC":"=A"(tsc))_oce
```



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gettimeofday (updating wc time based on TSC)

RDTSC(tsc); // Get current TSC value uint64 deltaTsc = tsc-old_tsc; // cycles since wc // Update the system time uint64 sinceUpdate = NANOSECONDS(deltaTsc); system_time += sinceUpdate // Move complete seconds to the second counter sinceUpdate += nanoseconds; seconds += sinceUpdate / 1000000000; nanoseconds = sinceUpdate % 1000000000; // Return second & microsecond values (Book Bug?) tp->tv_sec = seconds; tp->tv_usec = nanoseconds / 1000;

return 0;

gettimeofday (reading shared info)

do // Loop until shared info values can be read **do** // Spin if the time value is being updated $wc_version = shared_info.wc_version$: version = time->version; } while(isOdd(version) || isOdd(wc_version)); // Read the values seconds = shared_info.wc_sec: nanoseconds = shared_info.wc_nsec; system_time = time->system_time; $old_tsc = time \rightarrow tsc_timestamp;$ while(version != time->version wc_version != shared_info.wc_version): ▲■▶ ▲ 臣▶ ▲ 臣▶ 三臣 - わんで Secure OS Design and Implementation Xen

Time summary


- Time is an important service
- Elapse time for scheduling
- Elapse time is called system time
- Time of day is important for dealing with external entities
- For example, humans or other systems
- CPU power management complicates time calculations

Time

- And other issues effect time scaling as well
- In addition to this, ntp (network time protocol) is used to keep clocks accurate.

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Console

- A console is the simplest device
- It uses a 2048-byte output buffer
- It also uses a 1024-byte input buffer
- These buffers of circular producer-consumer buffers

Console

- A few variables in_cons, in_prod, out_cons, out_prod
- and signals when data is waiting in the output buffer.
- This same style is used in the XenStore, the block driver, and the network driver
- Goal: get console working as early as possible in the design of an OS so you can have better visibility into the execution

Xen console interface

struct xencons_interface { char in [1024]; char out[2048]; XENCONS_RING_IDX in_cons, in_prod; XENCONS_RING_IDX out_cons, out_prod; }

Console

- This data structure **must** be first mapped into a page shared by DomU and Dom0
- There is an event channel allocated for the console at system start

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XENCONS_RING_IDX

• the XENCONS_RING_IDX is an unsigned int

Console

- the prod side is only incremented by the sender
- the cons side is only incremented by the receiver
- the number of bytes in the buffer are prod cons
- of course this is limited to the size of the buffer
- to find the index *i* in the buffer *b*,
 i = MASK_XENCONS_IDX(prod, b)
- which will be between $0 \dots sizeof(b) 1$
- Note because the buffer is circular, cannot use memcpy (which assumes a linear buffer)

Console

Free running counters

- Xen's ring buffer use free running counters
- After putting in 2³² bytes counter will wrap around

Console

- That is, the XENCONS_RING_IDX value after $2^{32} 1$ is 0
- Nevertheless, *prod cons* always gives the number of bytes in the buffer
- Even if, say prod = 1 and $cons = 2^{32} 5$
- Note, this depends on using 2's complement arithmetic
- See book for more details

Mapping Xen console

- x86 page size is 4096 bytes, thus an address which points to start of page has low-order 12 bits equal to zero
- Rather than a machine address, Xen provides a machine frame number (mfn), which truncates the low-order 12-bits
- First map mfn to a pseudo-physical frame number (pfn)
- Second, compute the pseudo-physical address $p = pfn \ll 12$
- Third, from physical address p create virtual address $p+\&_text$
- (Xen maps physical addresses to virtual address in order)
- _text is the first virtual address of the kernel (it is given in the loader script)

Mapping the Xen console

```
int console_init(start_info_t * start)
{
    console = (struct xencons_interface*)
        ((machine_to_phys_mapping[
            start ->console.domU.mfn] << 12)
        +
        ((ulong)&_text));
    console_evt = start ->console.domU.evtchn;
    /* TODO: Set up the event channel */
    return 0;
}
```

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Console Console Console write Console write (wait for space) // write null terminated string int console_write(char * message) { struct evtchn_send event; // 1. wait until space is available back end consumes bytes in the buffer event.port = console_evt; int length = 0;XENCONS_RING_IDX data; // ring index while (* message $!= ' \setminus 0'$) do data = console->out_prod - console->out_cons; // 1. wait until space for a char is available HYPERVISOR_event_channel_op(EVTCHNOP_send, // 2. write the next char &event): mb(); HYPERVISOR_event_channel_op(EVTCHNOP_send, while (data >= sizeof(console->out)); &event): return length; ▲□▶ ▲□▶ ▲□▶ ▲□▶ ▲□ ● ● ●

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Console Console write (write the data) // write the next char int ring_index = MASK_XENCONS_IDX(console->out_prod , console ->out); console ->out [ring_index] = *message; // Ensure that the data is visible to // other processors before continuing wmb(); // Increment input and output pointers console ->out_prod++; length++: message++;

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
Secure OS Design and Implementation Xen Console Console read • To read the console you'll need an event handler for the console event • The handler is invoked when there is either • waiting input or • when bytes are remove by the consumer

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- The handler thus can
 - read the input
 - write more output
- We don't want the kernel to ever block unless there is *nothing* to do

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Virtual Memory

Xen Virtual Memory

- In Xen, physical addresses are allocated to Xen and to the various Doms
- Because of dynamic usage patterns and fragmentation the underlying addresses allocated to an OS may not be contiguous
- Xen's solution
 - machine addresses correspond to the hardware physical address
 - physical addresses are contiguous for a domain virtual addresses are allocated with holes
- Mappings change only the **frame number** (the high order 20 bits), not the address within a page (low order 12 bits)
- Thus, often concerned with mfn, pfn,

 Used by kernel

 date structures

 Filled by Xen


Virtual Memory

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Virtual Memory

Start of day memory layout

- The domain is started within contiguous virtual-memory region.
- The contiguous region ends on an aligned 4MB boundary (in Mini-OS it ends at 4MB).
- Bootstrap elements are packed together, but each is 4kB-aligned.
- The list of page frames forms a contiguous 'pseudo-physical' memory layout for the domain. In particular, the bootstrap virtual-memory region is a 1:1 mapping to the first section of the pseudo-physical map.
- All bootstrap elements are mapped read-writable for the guest OS. The only exception is the bootstrap page table, which is mapped read-only.
- There is guaranteed to be at least 512kB padding after the final bootstrap element. If necessary, the bootstrap virtual region is extended by an extra 4MB to ensure this.

Virtual Memory Order of bootstrap elements

- relocated kernel image
- initial ram disk [mod_start, mod_len]
- (The initial ram disk may be omitted.)
- Iist of allocated page frames [mfn_list , nr_pages]
- start_info_t structure [register ESI (x86)]
- bootstrap page tables [pt_base, CR3 (x86)]
- ø bootstrap stack [register ESP (x86)]

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Grant Tables

Grant tables

- Events are good for providing a notification, but not for passing lots of data
- To pass information, Xen uses shared memory
- These pages can be shared between domains or
- Between a domain and Xen
- (Xen controls all page tables, so it can enable this sharing)
- The Xen mechanism for this is called grant tables
- Grant tables can be used to transfer pages between domains,
- but this requires large transfers (many pages) to be efficient.

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• Grant tables can be used to *share* pages between domains

Grant Tables

Use of Grant Tables

- One or more shared pages are allocated to communicating for each device
- DomU treats this collection of shared pages as a ring buffer (a producer-consumer structure).
- Information is put in/taken out of the ring in FIFO order
- Events inform DomU when there is data waiting
- There are three fundamental devices for Xen

device buffer contents

Console printable text Disk disk blocks Network ethernet frames


Grant Tables

Grant entry structure

// Xen-3.2, available for backward compatibility
struct grant_entry_t {
 // GTF_permit_access:
 // Frame that @domid is allowed
 // to map and access. [GST]
 // GTF_accept_transfer:
 // Frame whose ownership
 // transferred by @domid. [XEN]
 uint16_t flags;
 domid_t domid; // domain to share with
 uint32 frame; // machine frame number
};


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Xen

${\sf XenStore}/{\sf XenBus}$

XenStore semantics

• Read a Key

- Write a Key
- Notify when a Key changes
- Iterator through a directory
- It supports transactions (and thus atomic operations)
- The XenStore is also accesible from user space, so that Dom0 tools can be used to manipulate them

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XenStore/XenBus

XenStore layout

- Domain specific information is stored by UUID, a "universally unique ID"
- UUID are essentially long random numbers, and hence the chance of a conflict (two domains using the same UUID) is essentially nil
- /vm/uuid stores configuration information about the domain with universal *uuid*
- /local/domain/uuid
- see http: //wiki.xensource.com/xenwiki/XenStoreReference

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XenStore/XenBus


XenStore commands

XS_READ, // read a key XS_WATCH, // watch for changes to key-value XS_UNWATCH, // unwatch a previously watched key // multi-message transaction XS_TRANSACTION_START, // start the transaction XS_TRANSACTION_END, // end the transaction XS_WRITE, // write a key XS_WATCH_EVENT, // response to a watch XS_ERROR, // an error

XenStore/XenBus

XenStore requests/responses

- The xsd_sockmsg is followed by zero or more null terminated strings
- The xsd_sockmsg plus following strings must fit within the 1024 byte buffer
- \bullet Errors are returned as strings, using type XS_ERROR



XenStore/XenBus

XenStore write

```
static uint req_id = 0; // incremented for each req
int xenstore_write(char * key, char * value)
{
    int key_length = strlen(key) + 1;
    int value_length = strlen(value) + 1;
    struct xsd_sockmsg msg = {
        .type = XS_WRITE,
        .req_id = req_id,
        .tx_id = 0,
        .len = key_length + value_length };
    // Write the message
    xenstore_write_request((char*)&msg, sizeof(msg));
    xenstore_write_request(key, key_length);
    xenstore_write_request(value, value_length);
    xenstore_write_request(value, value_length);
```

XenStore write

```
// Notify the back end
NOTIFY();
// really should do more error processing
xenstore_read_response((char*)&msg, sizeof(msg));
IGNORE(msg.len);
if (msg.req_id != req_id++)
{
  return -1;
}
return 0;
```

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XenStore/XenBus


Write the request

```
int xenstore_write_request(char *message, int lengt
{
    // Check that the message will fit
    if (length > XENSTORE_RING_SIZE) { return -1; }
    XENSTORE_RING_IDX i; // Fixed bug in original code
    // write bytes to ring buffer (see next slide)
    // Data is written to the ring, make it visible
    wmb();
    xenstore ->req_prod = i; // now tell Dom0 about it
    return 0;
}
```

${\sf XenStore}/{\sf XenBus}$

Write request inner loop

for (i=xenstore->req_prod; length > 0; i++,length--{
 // Wait for the back end to clear enough space i.
 XENSTORE_RING_IDX data;
 do
 {
 data = i - xenstore->req_cons;
 mb();
 } while (data >= sizeof(xenstore->req));
 // Copy the byte
 int ring_index = MASK_XENSTORE_IDX(i);
 xenstore->req[ring_index] = *message;
 message++;
}



Device drivers

Split drivers

- Xen doesn't contain device drivers
- Instead it relies on those in Dom0
- Hence Dom0 has privileges to access device drivers (DomU's don't)
- In fact, most code in Dom0 is device driver code
- Xen exports a number of pseudo-devices, including a console, disk, network.
- Xen's device interfaces are not like other VMs device drivers
- Which typically export gemu simulated devices

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• In either event, the exported devices are independent of the underlying physical devices

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Xen

Device drivers

Front end/back end

- Xen's devices are exported as ring buffers implemented in shared memory
- they are paired with events for signaling data availability
- A DomU implements the front-end device which
 - Puts the data in the shared memory buffer
 - And then uses a Xen event to signal that there is data available
- A Dom0 implements the back-end device which on output
 - Has a handler associated with the front-end device
 - When it receives an event, it remove the data from the ring buffer
 - And schedules it to be written out
 - Using Dom0 device drivers for that device
- On input the direction is from Dom0 to DomU


Concurrency

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Concurrency issues

- Concurrency issues are minimized in nanoOS because only one processor is executing in the OS at a time.
- But concurrency is inherent in OSs
- The primary issues we need to deal with are
 - Interrupts/Events can occur when other operations are occurring.
 - Memory semantics, in which ordering of memory operations is not consistent across cores.
 - Waits on shared structures for external events.

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Concurrency issues

| Interrupts | Minimize upper half processing. Disable interrupts |
|------------|--|
| | when doing the lower half processing. |

Concurrency

- Memory use barrier to ensure that memory operations are ordered relative to each other when using shared memory.
 - Waits latch object and queue if object is already busy. Must ensure deadlock is avoided.

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Atomic compare and exchange.

Split driver model

- Xen uses a split driver model in which I/O is performed in two steps
 - DomU requests I/O from Dom0
 - Dom0 performs the physical I/O using Linux's device drivers
- The DomU code is called the front end driver

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Disk

- The Dom0 code is called the back end driver
 - communicates with the back end
 - contains the device drivers for the physical devices
- This leverages the enormous codebase of device drivers in Linux
- And simplifies DomU device handling and Xen code

Disk

Disk

Part XVII

Image: A solworth Secure OS Design and Implementation

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Xen

Rings

• Front end communicates with the back end using rings

Disk

- It does this via ring indices which are uints
- each index is initialized to zero and incremented only by one side
- Requests are generated by one side and responses by the other
- The disk drive is implemented with one ring, since all disk operations are in response to DomU requests.

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| Device driver rings | Disk Device driver rings |
|---|---|
| Req_0 ^u DomU puts on request 0 | Req_0^u DomU puts on request 0 Req_0^u Req_1^u DomU puts on request 1 |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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Device driver rings

| Req_0^u | | DomU puts on request 0 |
|-----------|-----------|----------------------------|
| Req_0^u | Req_1^u | DomU puts on request 1 |
| Res_0^0 | Req_1^u | Dom0 responds to request 0 |

Disk

Device driver rings

| Req_0^u | | | DomU puts on request 0 |
|-----------|-----------|--|----------------------------|
| Req_0^u | Req_1^u | | DomU puts on request 1 |
| Res_0^0 | Req_1^u | | Dom0 responds to request 0 |
| | Req_1^u | | DomU removes response 0 |

Disk

Device driver rings

| Req_0^u | | DomU puts on request 0 |
|-----------|-----------|----------------------------|
| Req_0^u | Req_1^u | DomU puts on request 1 |
| Res_0^0 | Req_1^u | Dom0 responds to request 0 |
| | Req_1^u | DomU removes response 0 |
| | Res_1^0 | Dom0 responds to request 1 |

Disk

Device driver rings

| Req_0^u | | | DomU puts on request 0 |
|-----------|-----------|--|----------------------------|
| Req_0^u | Req_1^u | | DomU puts on request 1 |
| Res_0^0 | Req_1^u | | Dom0 responds to request 0 |
| | Req_1^u | | DomU removes response 0 |
| | Res_1^0 | | Dom0 responds to request 1 |
| | | | DomU removes response 1 |

Disk

There are three indices in this scheme, all initially 0

start incremented by DomU when response is removed.

tail points one after the last request enqueued. Incremented by DomU.

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response is between start and tail and is the last response added. Incremented by Dom0.

Disk

A Disk driver

- The ring buffer is just for disk command
- The data is transfered in separate grant pages

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Disk

- Data is transferred in 512 byte sectors,
- The device might require 4K blocks
- A disk op can ask for multiple segments to be read or written
- Disk ops can be reordered by backend, and hence there is a disk barrier

Disk driver initialization

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Disk Disk Block driver request Block driver request #define BLKIF_OP_READ 0 #define BLKIF_OP_WRITE struct blkif_request { 1 #define BLKIF_OP_WRITE_BARRIER 2 uint8 t operation; // BLKIF_OP_??? nr_segments; // number of segment #define BLKIF_OP_FLUSH_DISKCACHE 3 uint8_t id; // private guest val uint64_t // only for read/wri // sectors are 512 bytes. blkif_vdev_t handle ; blkif_sector_t sector_number;// start sector idx // normally first_sect =0 and last_sect=7 struct blkif_request_segment { struct blkif_request_segment grant_ref_t gref; // reference to I/O buffer fram seg [BLKIF_MAX_SEGMENTS_PER_REQUEST] // first_sect: first sector in frame to transfer }; // last_sect: last sector in frame to transfer uint8 t first_sect , last_sect ; }; ・ロト ・ 日 ・ ・ 日 ・ ・ 日 ・ うへの (日) (四) (日) (日) = ~~~ Secure OS Design and Implementation Secure OS Design and Implementation

Reading a block

```
char *page = new_page(); // Book Bug
grant_table_entry_t *ref = get_grant_ref();
ref ->frame = virt_to_mfn(page);
ref ->domid = backend_domain;
wmb();
ref ->flags = GTF_permit_access;
```

Disk

```
int readBlock(grant_table_entry_t *ref,
    blkif_sector_t sector, // disk sector address
    uint64 requestId, // echoed back on respons
    uint shouldNotify); // send event to do the
```


readBlock

```
blkif_request_t * request =
  RING_GET_REQUEST (private, private -> req_prod ++);
request \rightarrow operation = BLKIF_OP_READ;
request —>handle
                      = block_vdev:
request->sector_number = sector; // on disk
request \rightarrow id = requestId;
request \rightarrow nr_segments = 1;
request \rightarrow seg[0].gref = ref - GRANT_TABLE;
request \rightarrow seg [0]. first sect = 0;
request \rightarrow seg [0]. last_sect = 7;
RING_PUSH_REQUESTS_AND_CHECK_NOTIFY(
  private , shouldNotify );
if (shouldNotify) {
  struct evtchn_send event;
  event.port = block_port;
  HYPERVISOR_event_channel_op(EVTCHNOP_send, & event
```

Disk

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Completing back end initialization

- The initialization given so far is for the front end
- But still need to configure the back end
- To do that, the back end needs
 - The machine address of the ring page
 - The event channel for the device
- $\bullet\,$ The front end needs to negotiate with the backend
- And perhaps get some information from the backend

Disk

- Such as device characteristics
- All these are done using the XenBus

XenBus calls

• xenbus_transaction_start (&xbt) starts a transaction, reports back with transaction ID

Disk

Disk


- xenbus_printf (xbt, dir, key, fmt, v) writes to the XenStore in dir the key is given the value which is the result of sprintf (str, fmt, v)
- xenbus_switch_state (xbt, path, XenbusStateConnected), then the device is changed to the connected state. (It does this by doing a XenStore write of the new state for the path)
- \bullet xenbus_transaction_end (xbt, 0, &retry) ends the transaction


XenBus setup


Xen


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
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Summary

• In addition, interrupts are supported for entering into the kernel

Summarv

- Events are the abstraction of interrupts
- They can be used for physical IRQs in privileged domains, virtual IRQs, and interdomain communication.
- These events can be associated with handlers which are asynchronously called
- But this requires synchronization to prevent race conditions
- And it is best to minimize the amount of work done in the upper handler

Bringing the OS up

- Xen boots with paging turned on
- It initially communicates with the OS through start_info and shared_info
 - Which provides handles necessary to set up XenBus and console
 - And information about the virtual CPUs allocated to the OS
 - And event delivery from Xen to the OS
 - And time mechanisms for wallclock and scheduling
- With this information the console and XenStore can be brought up

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Bringing the OS up (cont'd)

• The Grant Table needs to be established, providing pages which can be shared between domains.

Summary

- A time of day clock is created which get timer interrupts
 - Timers ensure that a process does not hog the CPU
 - (The kernel is coded in such a way that this is not a danger)
- The XenStore is then brought up, allowing DomU to request new services from Dom0

Disk and Network Devices

- Devices depend on front-end drivers in DomU communicating with back-end Dom0 drivers
- The front end
 - Creates a ring buffer using a GrantTable Page

Summary

- An interdomain event port is created to signal when data is put on or taken off the ring buffer.
- This information is communicated with the backend via the XenBus
- The back end then configures the device
- GrantTable pages are then used for sending data to/from the back end

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